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Abstract
We design a choice experiment where the objects are valued according to only a single
attribute with a continuous measure and we can observe the true preferences of subjects.
However, subjects have an imperfect perception of their own preferences. Subjects are
given a choice set involving several lines of various lengths and are told to select one of
them. They strive to select the longest line because they are paid an amount that is
increasing in the length of their selection. Subjects also make their choices while they are
required to remember either a 6-digit number (high cognitive load) or a 1-digit number
(low cognitive load). We nd that subjects in the high load treatment make inferior line
selections and perform worse searches. When we restrict attention to the set of viewed
lines, we nd evidence that subjects in the high load treatment make worse choices than
subjects in the low load treatment. Therefore the low quality searches do not fully explain
the low quality choices. Our results suggest that cognition a¤ects choice, even in our
idealized choice setting. We also nd evidence of choice overload even when the choice set
is small and the objects are simple. Further, our experimental design permits a multinomial
discrete choice analysis on choice among single-attribute objects with an objective value.
The results of our analysis suggest that the errors in our data are better described as
having a Gumbel distribution rather than a normal distribution. Finally, we observe the
e¤ects of limited cognition, consistent with memory decay and attention.
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1 Introduction
Consider a subject making a binary choice between a bag of potato chips and a can of soda.
The choice from this relatively unhealthy set would allow the experimenter to conduct an
inference of the preferences of the subject. However, this inference is noisy and it is not
straightforward to detect a suboptimal choice.
If preferences are also elicited by a supplementary method (for example, eliciting either
willingness to pay or a ranking of the objects) the experimenter could compare the choice with
this alternate measure. However, both the choice and the supplementary elicitation are noisy.
In the case that preferences are not elicited by a di¤erent method, the experimenter would only
be able to identify that a suboptimal action was taken when intransitive choices were made.
In contrast to these two cases, we design an experiment where we have a perfect measure
of the preferences of subjects and we are therefore able to determine-without noise-whether
subjects selected a suboptimal action.
After the chips-soda choice, suppose that the subject is to make another choice from a
di¤erent set and the subject will only be given one of their two choices. This second binary
choice is between a can of orange soda and a glass of orange juice. Given an isolated choice
between these objects, the subject would prefer the orange soda. However, after the unhealthy
rst choice, the subject selects the orange juice. More generally, due to the repeated nature
of a choice experiment, the attributes of items in previous decision sets might interact with
subsequent decisions in a manner that is not discernible to the observer.
We design a choice experiment where the objects in our experiment are valued according
to only a single attribute and we can observe the true preferences of the subject. Further,
since the objects only have one objective value according to a single dimension, there will not
be an undetected relationship between one of several attributes from a previous choice and
one of several attributes of a subsequent choice.
The objects of choice are lines that vary in length. Subjects attempt to select the longest
line because they are paid an amount that is increasing in the length of their selection. While
we are able to observe the true objective length of each line, it is well-known that subjects have
2
imperfect perception of objectively measurable objects (Weber, 1834; Fechner, 1860; Thur-
stone, 1927a,b). In other words, even where objects have objectively measurable properties,
perception of them is imperfect.
Certain regularities regarding these imperfect perceptions have been known for some time.
Perhaps the oldest such regularity is that the larger the stimuli, the more di¢ cult it is to detect
absolute di¤erences between stimuli (Fechner, 1860). For instance, it is often more di¢ cult to
determine the heaviest between a 5kg weight and a 5.5kg weight than it is to determine the
heaviest between a 1kg weight and a 1.5 kg weight. This regularity is sometimes referred to
as Webers Law.
Further, the imperfect perception of objective quantities has led researchers to consider
that ones preferences might be imperfectly perceived and this has served as a justication
for random choice or random utility models. For instance, Bradley and Terry (1952), Luce
(1959a,b), Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1963), McFadden (1974, 1976, 1981, 2001), Yellott
(1977), and Falmagne (1978) each make explicit reference to Weber, Fechner, or Thurstone.1
However, despite this known connection between imperfect perception of objective properties
and stochastic choice, to our knowledge, we are the rst to conduct an experiment where
suboptimal choices are perfectly observable because utility is represented by a static, single-
attribute physical quantity with an uncountable measure.
Subjects are given a choice set involving several lines of various lengths and are directed
to select one of them. Subjects can only view one line at a time. This design simulates
the feature that deliberation about the desirability of an object compared to another object
crucially involves the memory of the assessments of the objects. This design also allows us to
observe the search history of subjects.
Subjects make their choice when under a cognitive load. This experimental manipulation
is designed to a¤ect the available cognitive resources of subjects, so that the relationship
1More recent papers that cite these authors include Luce (1994, 2005), Ballinger and Wilcox (1997), Loomis,
Peterson, Champ, Brown, and Lucero (1998), Butler (2000), Butler and Loomes (2007), Blavatskyy (2008,
2011), Rieskamp (2008), Caplin (2012), Lévy-Garboua, Maa, Masclet, and Terracol (2012), Fudenberg, Iijima,
and Strzalecki (2015), Agranov and Ortoleva (2017), Argenziano and Gilboa (2017), Khaw, Li, and Woodford
(2017), Alós-Ferrer, Fehr, and Netzer (2018), Caplin, Csaba, and Leahy (2018), Navarro-Martinez, Loomes,
Isoni, Butler, and Alaoui (2018), and Olschewski, Newell, and Scheibehenne (2019).
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between cognition and behavior can be observed.2 Some choices are made when required to
remember a 6-digit number (high cognitive load) and others when required to remember a
1-digit number (low cognitive load). We have observations about the searches and the choices
of subjects in both cognitive load treatments.
We nd that subjects in the high load treatment make inferior line selections. In particular,
the longest line is less likely to be selected and the di¤erence between the length of the longest
line and length of the selected line is larger in the high load treatment. We also nd that
subjects in the high load treatment conduct worse searches in that they have fewer unique line
views, fewer overall line views, and they spend less time viewing the longest line. When we
restrict attention to the set of viewed lines, we still nd evidence that subjects in the high load
treatment make worse choices than subjects in the low load treatment. Our results suggest
that, even in our idealized setting, choice is a¤ected by the availability of cognitive resources.
We also nd evidence of choice overload in a setting without complicated objects (our objects
are simply line lengths) or without many objects (our largest choice set has 6 items). Further,
our design permits a multinomial discrete choice analysis (McFadden, 1974) on choice among
single-attribute objects with an objective value. The results of our analysis suggest that the
errors in our data are better described as having a Gumbel distribution rather than a normal
distribution. Finally, we observe the e¤ects of limited cognition, consistent with memory decay
and attention.
2 Related literature
In order to make sense of choice data, researchers have advanced random utility or random
choice models. The classic e¤orts include Bradley and Terry (1952), Debreu (1958), Luce
(1959a,b), and Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1963). Numerous other random utility or
random choice experimental and theoretical papers have emerged in an e¤ort to better un-
2For instance, see Du¤y and Smith (2014) and Deck and Jahedi (2015).
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derstand choice.3 ;4 The conceptualization that utility is random has also lead to signicant
advances in econometrics (McFadden, 1974, 1976, 1981, 2001).
We are not the rst authors to study choice in a setting where outcomes depend on
an imperfectly perceived object. For instance, Caplin and Dean (2015) and Dutilh and
Rieskamp (2016) examine choice when the judgments involve imperfectly perceived static ob-
jects. Zeigenfuse, Pleskac, and Liu (2014) examine choice involving judgments of imperfectly
perceived dynamic objects. These papers are di¤erent from ours in many respects, perhaps
most notably because the imperfect perception in these settings could (in principle) be elimi-
nated by carefully counting the discrete and nite measures. By contrast, the measure of line
length is not countable and therefore the imperfect perception is more di¢ cult to eliminate.
To our knowledge, there are only two instances of papers that study choice where outcomes
depend on an imperfectly perceived object with an uncountable measure. However, both di¤er
from our setting. Tsetsos, Moran, Moreland, Chater, Usher, and Summereld (2016) study
choice that involves judgements of the heights of bars. Such a measure is uncountable, however
the size of the bars within each trial is dynamic: the subjects are charged with estimating the
distribution within a trial. By contrast, the size of each line in our setting is static within
each trial. Polanía, Krajbich, Grueschow, and Ru¤ (2014) examine choice in a setting where
outcomes are based on the area occupied by the image of various objects. Area is also an
uncountable measure. However, the images have di¤erent shapes and so the objects vary
according to several meaningful attributes. Therefore, to our knowledge, we are the rst to
study choice in a setting where outcomes depend on imperfectly perceived static objects with
an uncountable measure that varies only according to a single relevant attribute.
Some of the recent choice literature has focused on consideration set e¤ects, whereby
3A partial list of these e¤orts, not previously mentioned, would include Tversky (1969), Loomes, Starmer,
and Sugden (1989), Sopher and Gigliotti (1993), Loomes and Sugden (1995), Sopher and Narramore (2000),
Gul and Pesendorfer (2006), Rubinstein and Salant (2006), Tyson (2008), Caplin, Dean, and Martin (2011),
Conte, Hey, and Mo¤att (2011), Wilcox (2011), Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014), Loomes and Pogrebna
(2014), Woodford (2014), Caplin and Dean (2015), Caplin and Martin (2015), Cubitt, Navarro-Martinez, and
Starmer (2015), Lu (2016), Apesteguia, Ballester, and Lu (2017), Dean and Neligh (2017), Ahumada and Ulku
(2018), Apesteguia and Ballester (2018), Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2018), Koida (2018), Kovach and
Tserenjigmid (2018), Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2019), Conte and Hey (2019), and Natenzon (2019).
4For a partial list from the psychology literature, see Regenwetter, Dana and Davis-Stober (2011), Regen-
wetter, Dana, Davis-Stober, and Guo (2011), Regenwetter and Davis-Stober (2012), Birnbaum and Schmidt
(2008, 2011), and Birnbaum (2011).
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the decision maker does not consider the entire set of objects and this is not necessarily
observable to the experimenter.5 However, with our experimental design, we can observe the
consideration set and the objective lengths of the lines. We nd that the longest viewed line
is not selected in many trials and this selection is a¤ected by available cognitive resources.
We also nd evidence that subjects in the high load treatment make worse choices than
subjects in the low load treatment, even when we restrict attention to the set of viewed lines.
Our analysis therefore suggests that, while there are possibly also consideration set e¤ects,
imperfect perception about ones preferences is a key component to understanding stochastic
choice.
Matµejka and McKay (2015) o¤er a rational inattention foundation for discrete choice mod-
els. Agents optimally allocate costly attention in order to better understand the true state of
nature.6 Specically, the agents can reduce the Shannon entropy associated with the choice
setting by incurring costs associated with attention. The authors show that this implies a
random choice specication similar to Luce (1959a). In our experiment, there is a similar
process as subjects devote cognitive e¤ort in order to select the longest line in the choice set.
Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer, and Rangel (2011) report on a choice experiment that employs
eye tracking equipment. Subjects select items under time pressure (3 seconds) from choice
sets of 4, 9, and 16 objects. Prior to the choice, the experimenters elicit valuations of the
objects. This alternate elicitation allows the authors to judge the quality of the choices. The
authors nd that the quality of choices among the set of viewed objects decreased in the size
of the choice set. The authors also nd that the quality of searches decreased in the size of the
choice set. Additionally, the authors report that the spatial location of the object is related
to choice and that there is evidence that subjects exhibit memory decay of the value or the
location of the viewed object. Our experiment has a di¤erent design, as our subjects have,
for instance, 15 seconds to select among 2  6 single-attribute objects. Most notably though,
we can objectively determine the quality of the choice since we know the exact lengths of the
lines. Despite these design di¤erences, we nd many parallel results. For instance, we nd
5For instance, see Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay (2012), Manzini and Mariotti (2014), Aguiar, Boc-
cardi, and Dean (2016), Cattaneo, Ma, Masatlioglu, and Suleymanov (2017).
6Also see Weibull, Mattsson, and Voorneveld (2007).
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that the quality of the choice decreases in the size of the choice set and we observe outcomes
consistent with memory decay.
There is a large literature that employs the cognitive load manipulation in order to a¤ect
the available cognitive resources of subjects. Although much of this research appears in the
psychology literature, the technique is more frequently appearing in the economics literature,7
including in strategic settings.8 Most relevant to our purposes, research nds that subjects
in a high cognitive load treatment fail to process available and relevant information (Gilbert,
Pelham, and Krull, 1988; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, and Gilbert, 1990). We also note that
subjects under a cognitive load tend to perform worse on visual judgment tasks (Morey and
Cowan, 2004; Allen, Baddeley, and Hitch, 2006; Cocchi et al., 2011; Morey and Bieler, 2013;
Zokaei, Heider, and Husain, 2014; Allred, Crawford, Du¤y, and Smith, 2016).
To our knowledge, there are only two other examples of papers that employ the cognitive
load manipulation in a choice setting: Lee, Amir, and Ariely (2009) and Drichoutis and Nayga
(2018).
Lee, Amir, and Ariely (2009) study intransitive choices among pair-wise decisions made
while their subjects are under a cognitive load.9 Surprisingly, the authors nd that subjects
under a high cognitive load make fewer intransitive choices than subjects under a low cognitive
load. However, these are real world objects that have attributes whose desirability is not
observable to the experimenters. Further, the repeated nature of the experiment makes it
di¢ cult to determine if the attributes from previous choices a¤ected subsequent choices (either
because the attributes are regarded as complements or substitutes). By contrast our subjects
make judgments on objects that have a value based on single objective attribute.
Drichoutis and Nayga (2018) nd that a high cognitive load does not increase internal
inconsistency on a GARP budget allocation task. By contrast, we nd that the cognitive load
manipulation negatively a¤ects choices and searches.
7For instance, see Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2013), Schulz, Fischbacher, Thöni, and Utikal (2014),
Deck and Jahedi (2015), and Hauge et al. (2016).
8See Milinski and Wedekind (1998), Roch et al. (2000), Cappelletti, Güth, and Ploner (2011), Carpenter,
Graham, and Wolf (2013), Du¤y and Smith (2014), Allred, Du¤y, and Smith (2016), Buckert, Oechssler, and
Schwieren (2017), and Du¤y, Naddeo, Owens, and Smith (2019).
9See Experiment 4.
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Our experiment presents subjects with a decision problem with an objectively optimal
solution. However because of imperfections with the subjects, they are not able to attain
the optimal solution with certainty. This feature also appears in Gabaix et al. (2006) and
Sanjurjo (2015, 2017). There subjects are given a multi-attribute choice problem where each
attribute value is represented by a number. Since subjects cannot fully process the available
information, despite that there is an objectively optimal solution, the optimal solution is not
attained with certainty. Also similar to our setting, subjects must click on the information in
order to make it appear. In this way, similar to this multi-attribute literature, we can observe
the process of search.10
3 Experimental design
3.1 Overview
The experiment was programmed on E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pitts-
burgh, PA). The sessions were performed on standard 23 inch (58:42 cm) Dell Optiplex 9030
AIO monitors. E-Prime imposed a resolution of 1024 pixels by 768 pixels. A total of 92
subjects participated in the experiment.
3.2 Line selection task
In each round, subjects were presented a choice set of lines that ranged in number between
2 and 6. Each of these choice set sizes occurred with probability 15 and were drawn with
replacement. Subjects were able to only view one line at a time. The lines were labeled in
alphabetic order at the bottom of the screen. Letters A and B always represented the rst two
options, and consecutive letters were added as needed. Subjects could view a particular line
by clicking on the letter label that corresponds to that particular line. A click on a particular
letter label would reveal the corresponding line. To view another line, subjects click on its
corresponding label. This makes the new line appear and the old line disappear.
10Also see Payne, Braunstein, and Carroll (1978) and Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993).
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Each line appeared within a rectangular region of 400 pixels in the horizontal direction
and 150 pixels in the vertical direction. The boundaries of these regions were not visible to
the subjects. The lines were randomly o¤set vertically and horizontally within these regions
such that there was a minimum cushion between the line and the edge of the region. This
cushion was 20 pixels in the horizontal direction and 10 pixels in the vertical direction. The
o¤setting was xed for each line throughout each trial. The regions were non-overlapping and
arranged in 2 columns and 3 rows, with the regions for A and B in the top row, the regions
for C and D in the middle row, and the regions for E and F in the bottom row.
The length of the lines in any trial were determined by subtracting various amounts from
the longest line. There were 10 possible longest line lengths in pixels ranging in 16 pixel (0:80
cm) increments from 160 pixels (8:0 cm) to 304 pixels (15:1 cm). The lines each had a height
of 0:38 cm.
There were three line length treatments. In the di¢ cult treatment, one line was exactly
one pixel shorter than the longest, and the other di¤erences were drawn from a uniform on
f 1; :::; 11g. In the medium treatment, one line was exactly 12 pixels shorter than the
longest and the other di¤erences were drawn from a uniform on f 12; :::; 39g. In the easy
treatment, one line was exactly 40 pixels shorter than the longest, and the other di¤erences
were drawn from a uniform on f 40; :::; 100g. The di¢ cult, medium, and easy treatments
each occurred with probability 13 , in random order, and are drawn with replacement. The
subjects were not informed of the existence of these treatments.
Below each letter label was a box indicating that the subject currently selected that line.
Subjects could change this selection at any time during the allotted 15 seconds. The subjects
could view the time remaining, rounded to the nearest second. See Figure 1 for a screenshot11
and Figure 2 for a characterization of the regions, which are not visible to the subjects.
11See https://osf.io/srpzh/ for the full set of screenshots.
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Figure 1: Screenshot from a trial with 5 lines in the choice set, where line C is
being viewed, line B is currently selected as the longest, and there are 4 seconds
remaining.
10
Figure 2: A characterization of the regions, invisible to the subjects, which
contain the corresponding lines.
The choice within each trial was the line that was selected when the 15 seconds expired.
If the subjects did not select a line before time expired, it was assumed that the selected line
had a length of 0. Regardless of their actions in the line judgment screen, subjects would
only advance to the following screen when the 15 seconds had expired. The earnings for this
task were increasing in the length of the choice in that trial, at a rate of $1 per 240 pixels (or
$0:4167 per 100 pixels).
3.3 Cognitive load treatments
There were 50 trials where subjects were given a 6-digit number to remember, which we
refer to as high load. There were 50 trials where subjects were given a 1-digit number to
remember, which we refer to as low load. These were given in random order. Regardless of
11
the load, subjects were given 5 seconds to commit the number to memory.12 Subjects would
only proceed to the following screen when the 5 seconds had expired. Each of the 10 longest
line lengths were presented 5 times in the high load treatment and 5 times in the low load
treatment, also in random order.
3.4 Unincentivized practice
Prior to the incentivized portion of the experiment, subjects had unincentivized practice re-
membering both a 1-digit and a 6-digit number. In contrast to the incentivized portion of
the experiment, here subjects were told if their response was correct. If the response did
not contain the correct number of digits then subjects were directed to repeat the practice
memorization task.
Additionally, subjects had an unincentivized practice on the line selection task. Subjects
were given this practice with a choice set of 5 lines in the medium di¢ culty treatment. If the
subjects did not view any lines, did not select a line that they viewed, or did not select any
lines, the subjects were informed of this and were directed to repeat the practice line selection
task.
3.5 Payment details
Subjects completed 100 line selection tasks and 100 memorization tasks. Those who correctly
completed all 100 memorization tasks were paid for 30 randomly determined line selections,
those who correctly completed 99 were paid for 29, those who correctly completed 98 were
paid for 28, and so on, until subjects who correctly completed 70 or fewer memorization tasks
were not paid for any of the line selection tasks. In addition to these payments, subjects were
also paid a $5 show-up fee. Subjects were paid in cash and amounts were rounded up to the
nearest $0:25. Subjects earned a mean of $26:00.
12The subjects could not view the time remaining in this stage, as these numbers could interact with the
memorization number.
12
3.6 Discussion of the design
The goals of our incentive scheme are as follows: strongly incentivize the memorization task,
keep incentives for memorization in each period independent from incentives for the line se-
lection task in that particular period, and maintain identical line selection incentives for high
and low load memorization periods. To strive for these goals, we do not provide feedback on
the memorization task and we pay a number of randomly selected line selection outcomes that
is decreasing in the number of incorrect memorization tasks. Only 5 subjects out of 92 failed
to correctly perform at least 70 memorization tasks, suggesting that the incentive scheme was
su¢ ciently calibrated. In addition, as feedback was not given on the memorization task, it
is not clear whether subjects realized that they were near or below 70 correct. Finally, while
incorrectly answering a specic memorization task decreases incentives, this a¤ects both high
and low load trials equally and we are primarily interested in the di¤erence between these
treatments.
Subjects were given inexible time constraints. These xed times were given so that
subjects were not able to strategically allocate their time in the experiment. For instance, this
design would prohibit subjects in the high cognitive load treatment from spending less time
in the line judgment task so that they could proceed quickly to the memorization task stage.
The boundaries of the regions that contained the lines were not visible to these visible to
the subjects. Our concern was that any such aid would di¤erentially benet the judgment of
the lengths of extreme (very short or very long) lines. Regions that contained a line always
appeared in the identical spot for that trial. This was done in order to facilitate the location
of the lines.
Finally, we do not put any constraints on the nature of the search beyond the time con-
straints and the constraint that only one line could be viewed at a time.
13
4 Results
4.1 Cognitive load
A larger fraction of memorization tasks were correctly completed under low load (97:6%, 4490
of 4600) than high load (85:8%, 3947 of 4600) according to a Mann-Whitney test, Z = 20:53,
p < 0:001.
As each of the 92 subjects attempt 50 high load memorization tasks and 50 low load
memorization tasks, Table 1 presents a characterization of the subject-level distribution of the
number of correct memorization tasks by cognitive load treatment and the number pooled
across treatments.
Table 1: Distribution of subjects by number of correct memorization tasks
Restricted to cognitive load treatments
46  50 41  45 36  40 31  35 26  30 21  25 < 21 Total
High load 50 17 11 5 4 3 2 92
Low load 88 4 0 0 0 0 0 92
Pooled across cognitive load treatments
96  100 91  95 86  90 81  85 76  80 71  75 < 71 Total
Pooled 40 24 13 4 5 1 5 92
The upper panel characterizes the subject-level distribution of the number of
correct memorization tasks by cognitive load treatment. The lower panel charac-
terizes the subject-level distribution of the correct memorization tasks across both
cognitive load treatments.
Table 1 shows that 77 of the 92 subjects successfully completed more than 85% of their
memorization tasks correctly. This suggests that the incentives were su¢ cient to elicit cogni-
tive e¤ort on these tasks.
4.2 Quality of choices
Here we explore the optimality of choices. We dene the Selected longest variable to be a 1 if
the choice was the longest available line and a 0 otherwise. Table 2 characterizes the Selected
longest variable in the cognitive load and di¢ culty treatments.
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Table 2: Selected longest variable by di¢ culty treatment
Easy Medium Di¢ cult Pooled
High load 94:6% 73:1% 37:0% 68:9%
1497 of 1582 1124 of 1538 548 of 1480 3169 of 4600
Low load 96:8% 76:3% 38:5% 69:6%
1440 of 1487 1140 of 1495 623 of 1618 3203 of 4600
Pooled 95:7% 74:6% 37:8% 69:3%
2937 of 3069 2264 of 3033 1171 of 3089 6372 of 9200
It appears to be the case that the di¢ culty treatments were successful in that the longest
line is more likely to be selected in the easy treatment. Table 3 characterizes the variable by
cognitive load and number of lines treatments.
Table 3: Selected longest variable by number of lines treatment
2 Lines 3 Lines 4 Lines 5 Lines 6 Lines
High load 79:0% 74:0% 71:1% 62:3% 57:9%
710 of 899 690 of 932 674 of 948 580 of 931 515 of 890
Low load 78:0% 75:0% 68:0% 66:4% 61:1%
700 of 899 720 of 960 613 of 902 588 of 886 582 of 953
Pooled 78:4% 74:5% 69:6% 64:3% 59:5%
1410 of 1798 1410 of 1892 1287 of 1850 1168 of 1817 1097 of 1843
It also appears that the probability that the longest line is selected is decreasing in the
number of available lines. This appears to be suggestive of choice overload, even from a choice
set of only a few simple objects of choice. Table 4 characterizes the variable in the cognitive
load and longest line length treatments.
Table 4: Selected longest variable by longest line length treatment
160 176 192 208 224 240 256 272 288 304
High load 71:1% 72:0% 69:1% 70:7% 70:4% 70:4% 66:7% 71:5% 64:4% 62:6%
Low load 71:7% 73:9% 75:0% 69:8% 69:4% 68:5% 66:3% 68:0% 67:6% 66:1%
Pooled 71:4% 72:9% 72:1% 70:2% 69:9% 69:5% 66:5% 69:8% 66:0% 64:3%
The Pooled values each have 920 observations. The values restricted to a
cognitive load treatment each have 460 observations.
This suggests that the quality of choices decreases in the length of the longest line. In
Table 5 we characterize the variable according to the number of lines and the letter label of
the longest line.
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Table 5: Selected longest variable by number of lines and letter label of the longest
A B C D E F
2 Lines 77:0% 79:9%        
705 of 916 705 of 882
3 Lines 72:5% 72:5% 78:7%      
470 of 648 457 of 630 483 of 614
4 Lines 64:8% 62:0% 71:6% 79:3%    
289 of 446 279 of 450 351 of 490 368 of 464
5 Lines 64:1% 58:0% 62:8% 70:8% 66:0%  
236 of 368 215 of 371 219 of 349 250 of 353 248 of 376
6 Lines 50:8% 52:8% 50:0% 60:2% 64:5% 78:7%
167 of 329 161 of 305 144 of 288 197 of 327 180 of 279 248 of 315
There appear to be di¤erences in accuracy conditional on the letter label of the longest
line. Tables 2  5 suggest the relevant variables that should be included in the analysis of the
Selected longest line variable.
We now conduct regressions with the Selected longest variable as dependent variable. Since
the dependent variable is binary, we employ a logistic specication. We include the High load
variable, which obtains a 1 in the high load treatment, and a 0 otherwise. Further, since the
Selected longest variable appears to be a¤ected by the di¢ culty treatments, the number of
lines treatments, the longest line treatments, and the letter that contained the longest line,
we include these as independent variables. For the di¢ culty treatments, we include dummy
variables indicating whether the treatment was Easy or whether the treatment was Di¢ cult.
To account for the letter label of the longest line, we o¤er specications where we estimate a
unique dummy variable for each of the 20 combinations of letter-number of lines as in Table 5.
However, in the analysis immediately below we do not explore the e¤ect of the letter label on
the quality of the choice. We postpone our discussion of this issue until subsections 4:6 and
4:7. Due to the repeated nature of the observations, we also o¤er xed-e¤ects specications
where we estimate a dummy variable for each subject. We summarize these regressions in
Table 6.
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Table 6 Logistic regressions of the Selected longest line variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load  0:157  0:163  0:162  0:164
(0:054) (0:055) (0:056) (0:056)
Longest line normalized  0:003  0:003  0:003  0:003
(0:0006) (0:0006) (0:0006) (0:0006)
Number of lines normalized  0:315    0:327  
(0:020) (0:020)
Easy treatment dummy 2:068 2:126 2:218 2:287
(0:099) (0:100) (0:104) (0:106)
Di¢ cult treatment dummy  1:662  1:700  1:729  1:767
(0:058) (0:059) (0:060) (0:062)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects No No Y es Y es
AIC 8337:8 8180:5 8171:7 8014:6
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, or the
subject-specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions. AIC refers to the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1974). Each regression has 9200 observations. 
denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
In every specication, we see that the high load coe¢ cient is negative. This implies that
choices are worse in the high cognitive load treatment. We also nd that the accuracy of the
choice decreases when there is a larger number of lines (choice overload e¤ects) and decreases
in the di¢ culty of the decision. Additionally, we see that the accuracy decreases in the length
of the longest line. This result could be interpreted as suggesting that subjects are worse
at judging longer lines than shorter lines. This explanation is consistent with Webers law.
On the other hand, it is possible that the subjects expended less e¤ort on trials with longer
lines because the subjects knew that they would earn more on these trials than on trials with
shorter lines. These e¤ort-wealth e¤ects could also explain the negative coe¢ cient estimates
for the Longest line variable.
In the appendix, we also report additional analyses that investigate the optimality of
choice. We conduct the analogous tobit regressions with the Longest line minus the selected
line as dependent variable (Table A1). Our results are not changed. Together these results
imply that the availability of cognitive resources a¤ects the quality of the choice.
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4.3 Quality of searches
The analysis above suggests that the high cognitive load treatment implied worse choices.
Here we explore the e¤ect of the cognitive load on the quality of the searches. We dene
the View clicks variable as the number of total line view clicks during the search stage. We
conduct an analysis identical to Table 6, with the exception that the dependent variable is
View clicks and the regression is linear, not logistic. Table 7 summarizes this analysis.
Table 7 Regressions of the View clicks variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load  0:339  0:346  0:340  0:348
(0:049) (0:049) (0:040) (0:040)
Longest line normalized  0:002  0:002  0:002  0:002
(0:001) (0:001) (0:0004) (0:0004)
Number of lines normalized 1:082   1:083  
(0:017) (0:014)
Easy treatment dummy  1:459  1:470  1:421  1:431
(0:060) (0:060) (0:050) (0:050)
Di¢ cult treatment dummy 0:654 0:639 0:654 0:643
(0:060) (0:059) (0:050) (0:050)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects No No Y es Y es
AIC 41894:2 41815:7 38318:0 38221:7
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, or the
subject-specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions. AIC refers to the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1974). Each regression has 9200 observations. 
denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
Here we see fewer View clicks in the high load than in the low load. This suggests that
the cognitive load manipulation is a¤ecting the quality of the searches. We also observe that
View clicks is increasing in the number of available lines. Further, we observe that View clicks
is decreasing in the size of the longest line. This suggests that subjects expended less e¤ort in
the searches involving longer lines. Perhaps more surprisingly, we observe more View clicks in
the Di¢ cult treatment and fewer in the Easy treatment. Although we note that Reutskaja et
al. (2011), Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel (2010), and Krajbich and Rangel (2011) nd similar
results.
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In the appendix, we also report on additional analyses that investigate the optimality of
searches. These analyses are similar to Table 7 but with dependent variables that capture
the number of unique line views (Table A2), the number of times the longest line was viewed
(Table A3), and the average of the line lengths viewed weighted by their time viewed (Table
A4). In each of these analyses, we nd that the subjects in the high cognitive load treatment
perform worse searches than in the low cognitive load treatment.
4.4 Relationship between choice and search
We observe both that choices are worse in the high cognitive load treatment and that searches
are worse in the high cognitive load treatment. A natural question is whether the worse
searches are causing the worse choices. There is a literature that posits that suboptimal
choice occurs because subjects do not consider every object in the choice set, but only a subset.
Further this consideration set is not typically observable to the experimenter. However, due
to our design, we are able to observe whether subjects viewed the longest line.
Among the 9109 trials where subjects viewed the longest line, there are 6354 observations
where the longest line was not selected. However, among the 91 trials where subjects did
not view the longest line there are 73 observations where the longest line was not selected.
Therefore in our data, 98:9% of the suboptimal choices occurred in trials where the subject
viewed the longest line. This suggests that the bulk of our suboptimal choices can be explained
due to imperfect perception rather than not considering the longest line.
In Table 6 above, we explored whether subjects optimally selects the longest line by con-
ducting regressions with the Selected longest line variable. Another question to ask is whether
subjects selected the longest line, among the lines that were viewed. We dene the Selected
longest line viewed variable as a 1 if the longest line among those viewed was selected, and a
0 otherwise. We conduct an analysis, similar to Table 6 but rather than using the Selected
longest line variable, we employ the Selected longest line viewed variable. We summarize these
regressions in Table 8.
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Table 8 Logistic regressions of Selected longest line viewed variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load  0:142  0:148  0:145  0:148
(0:054) (0:055) (0:056) (0:056)
Longest line normalized  0:003  0:003  0:003  0:003
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Number of lines normalized  0:304    0:314  
(0:020) (0:020)
Easy treatment dummy 2:122 2:186 2:232 2:307
(0:102) (0:103) (0:105) (0:106)
Di¢ cult treatment dummy  1:661  1:703  1:726  1:769
(0:058) (0:059) (0:060) (0:062)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects No No Y es Y es
AIC 8304:9 8133:5 8176:0 8003:9
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, or the
subject-specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions. AIC refers to the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1974). Each regression has 9200 observations. 
denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
Even when we restrict attention to the set of viewed lines, we still nd evidence that sub-
jects in the high load treatment make worse choices than in the low load treatment. Therefore,
consideration set e¤ects cannot fully explain the relationship between cognitive load and the
Selected longest variable, as summarized in Table 6. Additionally, we note a negative rela-
tionship between the quality of choices among the lines that were viewed and the length of
the longest line. We note that while this cannot be explained by consideration set e¤ects, we
cannot distinguish between the Webers law explanation and the e¤ort-wealth e¤ects expla-
nation. Finally, we note the negative relationship between selecting the longest line viewed
and the number of lines in the choice set. Reutskaja et al. (2011) nd a similar relationship
in their data.
We also conduct an analysis, found in the appendix, that conducts the analogous analysis
by employing tobit regressions on the variable that is the length of the maximum line viewed
minus the length of the line selected (Table A5). Our results are not changed. Together our
results suggest that the consideration set e¤ects do not fully explain the suboptimal choices.
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4.5 Multinomial discrete choice analysis and the nature of the stochastic
utility
An assumption in multinomial discrete choice analysis is that choice is stochastic because
of an unobserved stochastic component in the utility function.13 A common specication in
these random utility models (RUM) is that there is a non-stochastic component of the utility
function and an additive stochastic component. For example, option j would have utility:
Uj = Vj + j ,
where Vj is the non-stochastic component and j is the random component. RUMs typically
assume that agents select the item with the largest realized utility. Specically, a choice of i
from the set K = f1; :::; kg arises when:
Vi + i  Vj + j for every j 2 K.
Further, the non-stochastic components to the RUMs are not typically observable. There-
fore the researcher includes a set of observable features possibly relevant to the choice j,
xj = (xj1; :::; xjn). In order to account for the e¤ect of each of these factors, the analyst also
estimates  = (1; :::; n). In these settings, the non-stochastic component is Vj =   xj .
However, in our setting, the length of the line is the only relevant attribute. Therefore the
non-stochastic component of option j simplies to:
Vj =   Lengthj ,
where  is a scalar.
We also note that there can be a range of specications of the stochastic component. For
instance, j might be assumed to be normally distributed. On the other hand, the stochastic
component might also be assumed to have the Gumbel distribution, e e  . (Confusingly, this is
also referred to as the Type I extreme-value distribution, the double exponential distribution,
13See McFadden (1974, 1976, 1981, 2001).
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and the log-Weibull distribution.) In our experiment, we can perfectly observe the objective
lengths of the lines and the choices made by the subjects. We can therefore run specications
that employ either of these assumptions of the error distribution and observe which provides
a better t of the data, given the objective lengths of the lines in the choice set.
We run one specication where the stochastic component has the Gumbel distribution
and is identically distributed for every option. As McFadden (1974) and Yellot (1977) show,
this structure implies the Luce (1959a) stochastic choice model, whereby the probability that
option j is selected from set K is:
P (j) =
eLengthjX
k2K e
Lengthk
.
We denote this Conditional Logistic model as specication (1).
We also run a specication where the stochastic component is assumed to have a normal
distribution and is independently and identically distributed for every option. Yellot (1977)
shows that this corresponds to Case V of Thurstone (1927a). We refer to this Multinomial
Probit model as "Multi Probit 1" and denote it as specication (2).
Further, we run a specication where the stochastic component is assumed to be Gum-
bel but the options are not identically distributed. Specically, each option has a stochastic
component distributed e e
  
i where i varies by the option. This specication is the Het-
eroschedastic Extreme-Value (HEV) model, introduced by Bhat (1995). For identication
purposes, the nal two options are assumed to be identically distributed with the unit scale:
k = k 1 = 1. We denote the HEV model as specication (3).
Finally, we run a specication where the stochastic component is assumed to be normally
but non-identically distributed. This Multinomial Probit specication assumes that the stan-
dard deviations of the options can be di¤erent but that they are also independently distributed.
Note that similar to the HEV model, for identication purposes, we assume that the standard
deviation of the nal two choices are identical. We refer to this Multinomial Probit model as
"Multi Probit 2" and denote it as specication (4).
Note that we exclude observations where subjects did not specify a choice before time
22
expired. Therefore, the numbers of trials as reported in Table 3 are di¤erent than those
reported below in this subsection.
We report the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC, Akaike, 1974) and the Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978) for each model, restricted to a particular number of
lines treatment. We also report the estimate of  for each model in each setting. These analy-
ses14 are summarized in Table 9. Note that for the case of 2 Lines, the Conditional Logistic
regression is identical to the HEV specication, and the Multinomial Probit 1 is identical to
the Multinomial Probit 2 specication. Therefore, we do not report specications (3) and (4)
for the 2 Lines treatment.
Table 9: Comparisons of di¤erent multinomial discrete choice models
Cond Logit Multi Probit 1 HEV Multi Probit 2 Trials
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2 Lines  est. 0:131 0:098     1785
AIC 1417 1432
BIC 1422 1437
3 Lines  est. 0:128 0:086 0:118 0:067 1871
AIC 2088 2140 2078 2145
BIC 2094 2146 2089 2156
4 Lines  est. 0:115 0:076 0:121 0:084 1826
AIC 2718 2801 2709 2820
BIC 2723 2807 2726 2837
5 Lines  est. 0:110 0:108 0:113 0:116 1780
AIC 3181 3383 3186 3282
BIC 3186 3389 3208 3304
6 Lines  est. 0:094 0:062 0:070 0:046 1780
AIC 3775 3808 3613 3684
BIC 3780 3813 3641 3711
We provide the estimates of , the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for the various models restricted to treat-
ments with identical numbers of lines. Each of the estimates for  are signicantly
di¤erent from 0 with p < 0:001.
For both AIC and BIC, every value for the Conditional Logit model (1) is lower than that
for the analogous Multinomial Probit 1 model (2). Additionally for both measures, every
14Each specication was executed with the MDC (multinomial discrete choice) procedure in SAS. Speci-
cation (1) was performed with the clogit option. Specication (2) was performed with the mprobit option.
Specication (3) was performed with the hev option and the Hardy integration method. Specication (4) was
performed with the mprobit option.
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value for the HEV model (3) is lower than that for the analogous Multinomial Probit 2 model
(4). We interpret these results as suggesting that the models that assume that errors have a
Gumbel distribution provide a better t than comparable models that assume that errors have
a normal distribution. However, we note that the estimates of  vary among the models, and
this is perhaps a¤ecting our results. In order to address this possibility, we o¤er an analysis,
identical to that summarized in Table 9, however we add an additional restriction that  = 0:1.
This analysis is summarized in Table 10.
Table 10: Comparisons of di¤erent restricted multinomial discrete choice models
Cond Logit Multi Probit 1 HEV Multi Probit 2 Trials
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2 Lines AIC 1435 1430     1785
BIC 1435 1430
3 Lines AIC 2116 2154 2087 2154 1871
BIC 2116 2154 2093 2160
4 Lines AIC 2729 2903 2722 2810 1826
BIC 2729 2903 2733 2821
5 Lines AIC 3186 3317 3190 3241 1780
BIC 3186 3317 3207 3257
6 Lines AIC 3776 4153 3691 4097 1780
BIC 3776 4153 3713 4119
We provide the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC) for the various models restricted to treatments with identical
numbers of lines. We have restricted  = 0:1 in each specication.
Similar to the analysis summarized in Table 9, with the exception of the 2 Lines treatment,
both the AIC and BIC are lower for the specications with Gumbel errors than for normal
errors. In 17 of 18 comparisons, the AIC of the Gumbel error specication is lower than that
for the normal error specication. Likewise, in 17 of 18 comparisons, the BIC of the Gumbel
error specication is lower than that for the normal error specication. We interpret these
results as evidence that the assumption that the errors have a Gumbel distribution is a better
t than the assumption that the errors have a normal distribution.
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4.6 Memory decay and choice
Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer, and Rangel (2011) report that the quality of choices tend to be
diminishing in number of items viewed between the last item viewed and the best item viewed.
Here we examine whether our subjects exhibit similar behavior consistent with memory decay.
Recall Table 5, which demonstrates the relationship between the quality of choice and the
letter label of the longest line. There appears to be a relationship between the quality of the
choice and number of letters alphabetically between the letter label of the longest line and the
last letter label in the choice set. Below, we test whether there is such a relationship.
We introduce the variable Distance from last, which provides a measure of the alphabetic
distance between the letter label of the longest line and the last letter label in the choice set.
For instance, in the 2 Line treatment, if line A is the longest then the variable is 1 and if line
B is the longest then it is 0. In the 3 Line treatment, if A is the longest then the variable is
2, if B is the longest then it is 1, and if C is the longest then 0. We include Distance from the
last as an independent variable. We also include specications with the interaction between
the High load dummy and the Distance from last variable. For identication reasons, we do
not include the Letter dummy variables. We summarize these regressions in Table 11.
Table 11 Logistic regressions of the Selected longest line variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load  0:163  0:138y  0:168  0:138
(0:055) (0:082) (0:056) (0:085)
Distance from last  0:245  0:237  0:259  0:250
(0:023) (0:030) (0:023) (0:030)
High load * Distance from last    0:016    0:019
(0:039) (0:040)
Longest line normalized  0:003  0:003  0:003  0:003
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Number of lines normalized  0:194  0:194  0:199  0:199
(0:023) (0:023) (0:023) (0:023)
Easy treatment dummy 2:113 2:113 2:270 2:271
(0:100) (0:100) (0:105) (0:105)
Di¢ cult treatment dummy  1:676  1:677  1:746  1:746
(0:059) (0:059) (0:061) (0:061)
Letter dummies No No No No
Fixed e¤ects No No Y es Y es
AIC 8220:1 8221:9 8049:6 8049:2
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We provide the coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the subject-specic dummies
in the xed e¤ects regressions. AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion
(Akaike, 1974). Each regression has 9200 observations.  denotes p < 0:001, 
denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
In every specication, we observe a negative relationship between Distance from last and
the quality of the choice. This is consistent with the hypothesis suggested by Table 5. We also
note that there is not a signicant interaction between the cognitive load and the Distance from
last variable. Additionally, each of the other coe¢ cients estimates are relatively unchanged
from the analysis summarized in Table 6. The exception to this is that the estimate of the
High load dummy coe¢ cient is not robust to the specications that include the interaction
between cognitive load and Distance from last.
One explanation for the negative coe¢ cient estimates for the Distance from last variable
is that subjects view the lines in alphabetical order (A then B then C etc.). However, lines
viewed in the more distant past are recalled with a lower precision: either the location of the
longest line or the length of the longest line. To explore this possibility, we dene the variable
Time since longest to be the time elapsed since subjects viewed the longest line when the trial
ended. Table 12 demonstrates the relationship between the Time since longest variable and
the letter label of the longest line.
Table 12: Time since longest line by number of lines and letter label of the longest
A B C D E F
2 Lines 2:491 s 1:452 s        
3 Lines 2:801 s 3:464 s 1:347 s      
4 Lines 3:150 s 3:335 s 3:232 s 1:810 s    
5 Lines 3:404 s 3:472 s 3:664 s 3:125 s 2:461 s  
6 Lines 4:117 s 3:986 s 3:627 s 3:270 s 3:211 s 1:800 s
Table 12 suggests that there is a negative relationship between the Time since longest
variable and the number of letter labels alphabetically between that for the longest line and
the last letter label in the choice set. Here we test whether there is such a relationship. To
do so, we conduct an analysis similar to Table 11, however we employ the Time since longest
variable rather than the Distance from last variable. We summarize these regressions in Table
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13. We interpret these results with caution due to the possibility of endogeneity introduced
by including the Time since longest variable.
Table 13 Logistic regressions of the Selected longest line variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load  0:099  0:147y  0:092  0:124
(0:061) (0:080) (0:063) (0:084)
Time since longest  0:288  0:296  0:318  0:323
(0:008) (0:012) (0:009) (0:013)
High load * Time since longest   0:014   0:010
(0:015) (0:016)
Longest line normalized  0:003  0:003  0:003  0:003
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Number of lines normalized  0:276  0:275  0:291  0:291
(0:022) (0:022) (0:023) (0:023)
Easy treatment dummy 2:534 2:531 2:650 2:648
(0:113) (0:113) (0:119) (0:119)
Di¢ cult treatment dummy  1:613  1:613  1:684  1:684
(0:066) (0:066) (0:069) (0:069)
Letter dummies No No No No
Fixed e¤ects No No Y es Y es
AIC 6802:6 6803:7 6590:8 6592:5
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the subject-specic dummies
in the xed e¤ects regressions. AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion
(Akaike, 1974). Each regression has 9200 observations.  denotes p < 0:001, 
denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
In every specication, there is a negative relationship between the time elapsed since the
longest line was viewed at the end of the trial and the quality of the choice. On the other hand,
we do not nd evidence that this relationship is a¤ected by the cognitive load. Further, we
observe qualitatively similar results to those found above, with the exception of the estimate
for the High load variable. In none of the specications is the estimate signicant at 0:05.
It seems that choices are worse when the longest line is more alphabetically distant from
the last letter label in the choice set and the longer the time since the longest line was viewed.
Taken together, our results are consistent with memory decay: lines viewed in the more
distant past are remembered with lower precision. We note that these results are consistent
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with limited cognition but we also note that we do not nd a relationship between the memory
decay e¤ects and the cognitive load manipulation. Finally, we note that these e¤ects might
be exacerbated by the relatively smaller spatial distance between F region and the F box
compared with the larger spatial distance between the A region and the A box.
4.7 Attention and choice
Testing for evidence consistent with memory decay is not the only such investigation on the
e¤ects of limited cognitive resources. Here we investigate the role of attention in choice.
Research nds that the time that a subject spends viewing (or xated on) an object in a
choice setting is associated with a higher likelihood of selecting the object.15 Additionally, the
visual psychology literature also nds that spatial resolution of abstract objects and visual
information processing are enhanced by attention.16
One measure of attention is the total time spent viewing a line. In Table 14, we summarize
the Time viewing variable by the number of lines treatment and the letter label.
Table 14: Time viewing by number of lines and letter label
A B C D E F
2 Lines 6:338 s 6:909 s        
3 Lines 4:356 s 3:675 s 5:195 s      
4 Lines 3:238 s 2:966 s 2:953 s 4:104 s    
5 Lines 2:733 s 2:443 s 2:367 s 2:454 s 3:262 s  
6 Lines 2:263 s 2:080 s 1:993 s 2:005 s 1:975 s 2:938 s
In Table 15, we report the Time viewing variable but restricted to the letter label of the
longest line.
Table 15: Total time viewing longest by number of lines and letter label of the longest
A B C D E F
2 Lines 8:410 s 9:028 s        
3 Lines 7:020 s 6:010 s 7:805 s      
4 Lines 5:622 s 5:252 s 5:074 s 6:351 s    
5 Lines 5:047 s 4:374 s 4:351 s 4:170 s 5:040 s  
6 Lines 3:992 s 3:772 s 3:600 s 3:778 s 3:806 s 4:994 s
15See Armel, Beaumel, and Rangel (2008), Armel and Rangel (2008), Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel (2010),
and Krajbich and Rangel (2011).
16For instance, see Yeshurun and Carrasco (1998), Carrasco and McElree (2001), Carrasco, Williams, and
Yeshurun (2002), and Liu, Abrams, and Carrasco (2009).
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Comparing Tables 5 and 15, there appears to be a relationship between the time spent
viewing the longest line and the likelihood that the longest line was selected. Here we test
this conjecture. We perform an analysis similar to Tables 11 and 13 but with Time viewing
longest as an independent variable. We summarize these regressions in Table 16. Similar
to the analysis summarized in Table 13, we interpret these results with caution due to the
possibility of endogeneity introduced by including the Time viewing longest variable.
Table 16 Logistic regressions of the Selected longest line variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load  0:105 0:030  0:112y 0:019
(0:065) (0:120) (0:067) (0:125)
Time viewing longest 0:536 0:556 0:561 0:579
(0:014) (0:020) (0:015) (0:021)
High load * Time viewing longest    0:035    0:034
(0:026) (0:027)
Longest line normalized  0:003  0:003  0:003  0:003
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Number of lines normalized 0:121 0:122 0:135 0:137
(0:025) (0:025) (0:026) (0:026)
Easy treatment dummy 2:297 2:293 2:396 2:391
(0:112) (0:112) (0:120) (0:120)
Di¢ cult treatment dummy  1:387  1:387  1:441  1:441
(0:070) (0:070) (0:073) (0:073)
Letter dummies No No No No
Fixed e¤ects No No Y es Y es
AIC 6054:4 6054:6 5974:5 5975:0
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the subject-specic dummies
in the xed e¤ects regressions. AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion
(Akaike, 1974). Each regression has 9200 observations.  denotes p < 0:001, 
denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
In every specication, the quality of the choice is increasing in the time viewing the longest
line.17 A similar result is reported by Krajbich and Rangel (2011). Also in every specication,
we do not nd a signicant interaction between the cognitive load and the time viewing the
longest. We also nd a similar relationship involving the di¢ culty treatments and the length
17We nd similar results if we measure attention with the number of view clicks on the longest line or
whether subjects viewed the longest line 2 or more times.
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of the longest line variable. However, we observe that the Number of lines coe¢ cient estimate
is positive. This is likely related to the apparently negative relationship between Time viewing
longest variable and the longest line variable.
Our results suggest that (endogenous) attention is related to choice. However, we do not
nd that the cognitive load manipulation a¤ects this relationship.
5 Conclusion
We observe subjects in an "idealized" choice setting where we know the true preferences of the
subjects, but subjects have an imperfect perception of their preferences. The objects of choice
are lines that vary in length and subjects are paid an amount increasing in the length of the
selected line. This feature allows us to make unambiguous conclusions about the optimality
of choices. Subjects also make their choices in di¤erent cognitive load treatments, which are
designed to manipulate their available cognitive resources.
Are there brains in choice? Our results suggest a qualied "yes." In our choice setting,
we found that di¤erences in available cognitive resources, as manipulated by cognitive load,
implied di¤erences in both choice and search. Further, we observe that cognitive load a¤ects
the quality of the choice, even when we restrict attention to the set of observed lines. This
suggests that the relatively low quality searches in the high cognitive load treatment are not
the primary cause of the suboptimal choices.
Additionally, we nd evidence of choice overload in our setting, where the choice set is
small and the objects are simple. We also observe limited cognition e¤ects, consistent with
memory decay and attention. However, we note that these e¤ects that are consistent with
memory decay and attention are not a¤ected by the cognitive load manipulation.
Many random utility models posit that there is a non-stochastic component and an additive
stochastic component, which is also referred to as an error term. An additional advantage of
our design, where we know the true preferences of the subjects, is that we are well-positioned
to test the nature of these errors. We run specications that assume normally distributed
errors and analogous specications that assume errors have a Gumbel distribution. We nd
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that in 17 of 18 pairwise comparisons, the Gumbel specications provide a better t. We
interpret this as suggesting that the assumption of Gumbel errors is more accurate than the
assumption of normal errors.
We admit that there is much work to be done on the topic. We are interested to learn the
insights gleaned from eye-tracking and neuroeconomics techniques in our setting.18 We are also
interested in whether our results on Gumbel errors extend to other stimuli with uncountable
measures, for example brightness, loudness, etc. Whereas our design entailed objects valued
on only a single attribute, we hope that future designs will study behavior in settings where
the objects are valued based on multiple attributes (Gabaix et al., 2006; Sanjurjo, 2015,
2017). Specically, we are interested to learn if classic multiple attribute e¤ects, such as the
decoy e¤ect, can be replicated in this setting and if the attributes interact as compliments or
substitutes.19
Further, alternate payment schemes could yield additional insights. For instance, rather
than paying an amount that increases in the length of the selected line, consider a xed pay-
ment if the longest line in the choice set is selected. This could help us distinguish between the
Webers law explanation and the e¤ort-wealth e¤ects explanation for the negative relationship
between the quality of choice and the length of the lines.
Finally, in our design, subjects were forced to select only a single object from the choice
set. We are interested to study behavior if subjects are not constrained to select only one,
and are able to select more than one object. Such a multiple selection could be interpreted as
indi¤erence if the received object was randomly selected among the chosen objects. We leave
these and other interesting questions to future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 More on the quality of choices
In order to investigate the optimality of choices, in Table 6 we summarized logistic regressions
of the Selected longest variable. Here we perform the analogous exercise but we analyze the
Longest minus selected variable, dened to be the length of the longest line minus the length
of the selected line. As this variable is bounded below by 0 we perform tobit regressions. The
regressions are otherwise identical to those in Table 6. We summarize these tobit regressions
in Table A1.
Table A1 Tobit regressions of Longest minus selected variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load 6:745 6:987 6:641 6:872
(1:832) (1:835) (1:784) (1:786)
Longest line normalized 0:133 0:132 0:131 0:131
(0:020) (0:020) (0:019) (0:019)
Number of lines normalized 10:007   9:915  
(0:664) (0:649)
Easy treatment dummy  53:686  53:828  56:245  56:505
(2:967) (2:975) (2:987) (2:996)
Di¢ cult treatment dummy 34:991 34:850 34:379 34:180
(2:092) (2:096) (2:044) (2:047)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects No No Y es Y es
AIC 35721 35674 35445 35398
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, or the
subject-specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions. AIC refers to the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1974). Each regression has 9200 observations. 
denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
Similar to Table 6, the accuracy of the choice decreases when there is a larger number of
lines, decreases in the length of the longest line, and decreases in the di¢ culty of the decision.
Further, in every specication, we see that the high load coe¢ cient is positive. This implies
that choices are worse in the high cognitive load treatment.
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6.2 More on the quality of searches
In order to investigate the optimality of searches, we summarized the regressions of the View
clicks variable (Table 7). Here we perform the analogous exercise but we analyze the Unique
lines viewed variable, dened to be the number of unique lines viewed during a trial. This
analysis is summarized in Table A2.
Table A2 Regressions of Unique lines viewed variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load  0:027  0:027  0:027  0:027
(0:008) (0:008) (0:007) (0:007)
Longest line normalized  0:0002  0:0002  0:0002  0:0002
(0:0001) (0:0001) (0:0001) (0:0001)
Number of lines normalized 0:981   0:982  
(0:003) (0:002)
Easy treatment dummy 0:008 0:008 0:014y 0:014
(0:010) (0:010) (0:009) (0:009)
Di¢ cult treatment dummy  0:010  0:010  0:003  0:003
(0:010) (0:010) (0:009) (0:009)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects No No Y es Y es
AIC 8231:0 8322:5 6483:0 6583:5
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, or the
subject-specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions. AIC refers to the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1974). Each regression has 9200 observations. 
denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
Similar to Table 7, we nd evidence of worse searches in the high cognitive load treatment.
Also interestingly, we nd that the Number of lines coe¢ cient is close to, but smaller than, 1.
This suggests that adding another line to the choice set implies that the number of unique lines
viewed increases by less than 1. Next we investigate the optimality of searches by performing
the analogous analysis but with the View clicks on longest variable, dened to be the number
of times that the longest line was viewed during a trial. This analysis is summarized in Table
A3.
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Table A3 Regressions of View clicks on longest variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load  0:128  0:136  0:128  0:137
(0:020) (0:020) (0:018) (0:017)
Longest line normalized  0:0003  0:0004y  0:0003  0:0004
(0:0002) (0:0002) (0:0002) (0:0002)
Number of lines normalized  0:124    0:123  
(0:007) (0:006)
Easy treatment dummy  0:406  0:413  0:390  0:397
(0:025) (0:024) (0:022) (0:021)
Di¢ cult treatment dummy  0:099  0:110  0:099  0:109
(0:025) (0:024) (0:022) (0:021)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects No No Y es Y es
AIC 25678:8 25304:9 23533:6 23028:9
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, or the
subject-specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions. AIC refers to the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1974). Each regression has 9200 observations. 
denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
We nd evidence that subjects in the high cognitive load treatment view the longest line a
smaller number of times than the subjects in the low cognitive load treatment. Again, similar
to Table 7 and A2, we see evidence that the high cognitive load negatively a¤ects search.
Interestingly, the estimates for both the Easy treatment dummy and the Di¢ cult treatment
dummy variables are negative. Perhaps this is the case because in the Easy treatment, there
is not a need to verify the longest line with an additional click. And perhaps in the Di¢ cult
treatment, nding the longest line is excessively di¢ cult.
We conduct another analysis of the quality of the searches, similar to the analysis above.
However, as the dependent variable we employ Line lengths weighted by time variable, dened
to be the average of the line lengths viewed weighted by the fraction of the trial in which it
was viewed. This is summarized in Table A4.
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Table A4 Regressions of Line lengths weighted by time variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load  3:536  3:478  3:531  3:465
(0:460) (0:459) (0:404) (0:404)
Longest line normalized 0:869 0:870 0:869 0:870
(0:005) (0:005) (0:004) (0:004)
Number of lines normalized  3:148    3:180  
(0:163) (0:144)
Easy treatment dummy  13:172  13:190  12:850  12:840
(0:564) (0:564) (0:498) (0:498)
Di¢ cult treatment dummy 5:496 5:495 5:892 5:907
(0:563) (0:562) (0:498) (0:497)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects No No Y es Y es
AIC 83013:3 82913:1 80271:3 80166:6
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, or the
subject-specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions. AIC refers to the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1974). Each regression has 9200 observations. 
denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
The line lengths weighted by time viewed is signicantly smaller in the low cognitive load
treatment. Again, we nd evidence that subjects in the high cognitive load treatment conduct
worse searches.
6.3 More on the relationship between choice and search
In order to investigate the relationship between choice and search, in Table 8 we summarized
logistic regressions of the Selected longest line viewed variable. Here we perform the analogous
exercise but we analyze the Longest viewed minus selected variable, dened to be the length
of the longest line viewed minus the length of the selected line. As this variable is bounded
below by 0 we perform tobit regressions. The analysis is otherwise identical to those in Table
8. We summarize these tobit regressions in Table A5.
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Table A5 Tobit regressions of Longest viewed minus selected variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High load 5:539 5:765 5:473 5:694
(1:791) (1:793) (1:759) (1:761)
Longest line normalized 0:126 0:125 0:123 0:122
(0:019) (0:019) (0:019) (0:019)
Number of lines normalized 9:820   9:815  
(0:649) (0:641)
Easy treatment dummy  56:041  56:386  57:441  57:892
(2:996) (3:010) (3:011) (3:026)
Di¢ cult treatment dummy 34:258 34:087 34:196 33:976
(2:034) (2:037) (2:010) (2:013)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects No No Y es Y es
AIC 34825 34768 34697 34638
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, or the
subject-specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions. AIC refers to the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1974). Each regression has 9200 observations. 
denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
Similar to Table 8, the accuracy of the choice decreases when there is a larger number of
lines, decreases when the longest line is longer, and decreases in the di¢ culty of the decision.
Further, in every specication, we see that the high load coe¢ cient is positive. This implies
that choices are worse in the high cognitive load treatment.
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